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Abstract. In this paper, we assess the security and testability of the
state-of-the-art design-for-security (DFS) architectures in the presence
of scan-chain locking/obfuscation, a group of solution that has previ-
ously proposed to restrict unauthorized access to the scan chain. We
discuss the key leakage vulnerability in the recently published prior-art
DFS architectures. This leakage relies on the potential glitches in the
DFS architecture that could lead the adversary to make a leakage con-
dition in the circuit. Also, we demonstrate that the state-of-the-art DFS
architectures impose some substantial architectural drawbacks that mod-
erately affect both test flow and design constraints. We propose a new
DFS architecture for building a secure scan chain architecture while ad-
dressing the potential of key leakage. The proposed architecture allows
the designer to perform the structural test with no limitation, enabling
an untrusted foundry to utilize the scan chain for manufacturing fault
testing without needing to access the scan chain. Our proposed solution
poses negligible limitation/overhead on the test flow, as well as the design
criteria.
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The large cost of building semiconductor fabrication foundries, the ever-
increasing density of ICs using smaller technology nodes, and significant main-
tenance and operation costs of the semiconductor facilities, have forced many
high-tech companies to outsource many design stages, including the fabrication
[1], making IC supply chain a global one. This financially and economically sen-
sible vertical supply-chain model, however, has raised many security and trust
concerns including but not limited to IP piracy, reverse engineering, and IC
overproduction [15].
To combat these threats, amongst many countermeasure solutions, logic ob-
fuscation [6] introduces a form of post-manufacturing programming into the de-
sign, making the functionality of the circuit dependent to the programming val-
ues, referred to as the key. After fabrication, when the design house receives the
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fabricated ICs, the correct key is programmed into a tamper-proof non-volatile
memory (tpNVM) [20], reducing the functionality of the IP to the correct func-
tionality. If the inserted key is not the correct key, the obfuscated design imple-
ment a different bogus function, generating a different output response (output
corruption) to the same input.
In 2015, the introduction of the Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attack [19,13]
challenged the validity/strength of all prior logic obfuscation solutions. The SAT
attack was able to easily break logic obfuscation solutions in a matter of seconds
to minutes, shattering the false sense of security of all prior-art logic obfusca-
tion solutions. The original SAT attack is applicable to combinational circuits.
However, the existence of the much-needed scan chain for functional and struc-
tural testing, makes the sequential circuits also vulnerable to this attack when
an adversary gains access to the scan chain.
After the introduction of the SAT attack, a wide range of new logic obfusca-
tion solutions have been introduced in the literature to combat/prevent the SAT
attack. These countermeasures could be divided into logic obfuscation solutions
aiming to (1) formulate and apply a SAT-resilient logic obfuscation solution, and
those aiming to (2) restrict unauthorized access to the scan chain.
Regarding the former category, they could be further broken down into (a)
logical SAT-hard solutions such as SFLL [17] and Full-lock [3], and (b) be-
havioural SAT-inapplicable obfuscation techniques, such as cyclic logic locking
[7], or Delay Logic Locking (DLL) [27]. Logical SAT-hard solutions aim at in-
creasing either the number of SAT attack iterations [17] or the number of recur-
sive calls in each iteration of the SAT attack to a sufficiently large number [3].
However, the problem with this group is either the extremely low output cor-
ruption (in SFLL [17]) or a large area overhead (in Full-lock [3]). On the other
hand, the behavioral SAT-inapplicable obfuscation techniques aim to build tech-
niques in a way that cannot be modeled using the SAT attack, such as cycles
that trap the SAT solver or delay locking that cannot be modeled by the SAT
attack. However, this breed was later broken by SAT inspired attacks on cyclic
obfuscation such as CycSAT [4] and satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) attack
[10,11].
Blocking unauthorized access to the scan chain as the latter category limits
the access of an adversary only to the primary inputs and primary outputs
(PI/PO) [21,26,24,25,9]. Expanding on the SAT attack, it was later shown, that
an adversary can still attack a sequential circuit with no access to the scan
chain by using an unrolling-based SAT attack [14] or a bounded-model-checking
(BMC) attack [12]. However, these sequential attacks are far weaker than pure
SAT and are mostly applicable to moderately small sequential circuits. Since
the sequential attacks are not scalable, by blocking the scan chain, and applying
many of the prior logic obfuscation techniques, a moderately size obfuscated
netlist could easily resist such attacks.
Prior work on restricting unauthorized access to the scan chain could be di-
vided into (1) scan chain obfuscation [21,26] and (2) scan chain blocking [24,25].
In the scan chain obfuscation techniques, such as encrypt flip-flop [21] or dy-
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namically obfuscated scan (DOS) [26], the scan chain is statically or dynami-
cally locked by inserting key gates. However, ScanSAT [12] could break both
statically and dynamically scan chain obfuscation techniques by transforming
the obfuscated scan chain into a combinational circuit and thereby launching
the SAT attack on them (the unrolling-based SAT) [12].
In the scan chain blocking techniques, after loading the obfuscation key (from
tpNVM), the access to the scan-out(s) (SO) would be blocked [24]. By eliminat-
ing the access to the SO, an adversary’s ability to monitor the behavior of the
circuit will be limited only to the PO. This eliminates the possibility of the SAT
attack as well as any attack that requires access to the scan chain, forcing an
attacker to use the far weaker and non-scalable sequential attacks.
Scan chain blocking in the presence of logic obfuscation was first introduced
in [24]. In the rest of this paper we refer to this solution as robust design-for-
security (R-DFS). In addition to blocking the SO, the R-DFS also introduces
a new storage element for holding the obfuscation key, denoted by secure cell
(SC). However, the security of the R-DFS architecture was later challenged by
the shift-and-leak attack [18]. To remedy the leakage issue, the authors proposed
modification to the scan blocking architecture (we call it mR-DFS), equipping
the SCs with a mode switch shift disable (MSSD) circuitry [18]. The mR-DFS
blocks any shift operation after the obfuscation key is loaded from the tpNVM,
removing the ability of an adversary to apply the shift-and-leak attack.
In this paper, by showing the architectural drawbacks of mR-DFS, we in-
troduce our proposed DFS scan blocking architecture for protecting the logic
obfuscation key. More precisely, the contributions of this work are as follows:
(1) We illustrate how a glitch-based shift-and-leak attack allows an adversary
to leak the logic obfuscation key even if the shift operation is disabled in mR-
DFS, thereby, leaking the actual logic obfuscation key through the PO. (2) As
a countermeasure, we propose a new key-trapped design-for-security (kt-DFS)
architecture, where the scan chain that loads the logic obfuscation key is fully
detached from regular scan chain(s). To fulfill this requirement, we propose a
new secure cell design content of which cannot be shifted in the scan chain after
a key registration event is observed. (3) We assess the security of proposed kt-
DFS, and compare the proposed solution with R-DFS and mR-DFS. As shown
in Table 1, we will illustrate how the kt-DFS can support both structural and
functional testing while resisting all leaky-based and SAT-based attacks on logic
locking.
1 Background
Both R-DFS [24] and mR-DFS [18] block the SO pins after the obfuscation
key is loaded into the design. The mR-DFS is built on top of R-DFS to fix the
leakage issue. In the following section, we first describe how R-DFS works. Then,
we explain the leakage issue identified in R-DFS, motivating the shift-and-leak
attack. Then, we describe how mR-DFS remedies the problem with disabling
shift operations after loading the obfuscation key.
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Table 1: Comparison of the Existing DFS architectures with our proposed kt-DFS.
Defenses
Test Test Resilient against
Time Complexity ScanSAT [12] Shift&leak [18] Glitch&Leak
EFF + RLL [21] low None 7 3 3
R-DFS + SLL [24] low None 3 7 3
mR-DFS + SLL [18] high
key reload
3 3 7
per pattern
kt-DFS + SLL low None 3 3 3
1.1 R-DFS: Restricting Scan Access
In R-DFS [24], the obfuscation key is stored in a custom-designed scan (storage)
cell, denoted as secure cell (SC). As shown in Fig. 1(a), in R-DFS, each key
value is stored in one SC. The R-DFS architecture, as indicated in Table 2,
allows four types/modes of operation based on the Test and SE pins. The key
values could be loaded into SCs either directly from tpNVM (actual key values
in mode M0) or the scan-in (dummy/actual key in mode M2). The scan chains,
as shown in Fig. 1(b), are constructed by stitching the SCs with regular scan
Flip-Flops (SFF). The SFFs in this paper are denoted as Regular Cells (RC).
The SCs keep their previous values in modes M1a and M1b. The only difference
between the M1a and M1b mode is the value of the SE pin that determines the
shift/capture mode in RCs. Both of the M1a and M1b modes allow the SCs to
be bypassed (keeping their previous values) when the RCs are in shift/capture
mode.
For the structural (a.k.a manufacturing fault) test, the Test pin must be 1,
allowing the shift and capture operations to be carried in modes M2 and M1b
respectively, giving unrestricted access to the scan. On the other hand, for a
functional test, first, the correct key is loaded from tpNVM into SCs using the
mode M0. Then, the initial state is loaded into the RCs in mode M1a, with no
change on the key value in SCs. Finally, the response is observed at the PO in
mode M0. To block unauthorized access to the scan chain (when a valid key is
loaded), as illustrated in Fig. 1(b), the R-DFS architecture utilizes a SO-blockage
circuitry. This module blocks/masks the SOs upon a switch from functional
mode (mode M0 that loads the actual key into SCs) to test mode (mode M2
that supports the shift operation). Hence, after loading the key in mode M0, SO
will no longer be accessible, removing the possibility of SAT attack, and limiting
the adversary’s attack option to the far weaker and non-scalable unrolling-based
or BMC based attacks.
1.2 Shift-and-Leak Attack on R-DFS
Although R-DFS breaks the SAT attack by blocking the SO, the introduction
of shift-and-leak attack [18] shows that there is a valid key leakage possibility
in R-DFS that allows the adversary to observe and extract the logic obfuscation
4
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Fig. 1: (a) Secure Cell (SC) vs. Regular Cell (RC), (b) Restricted Unauthorized Scan
Access using Blockage Circuitry.
Table 2: Modes of Operation in Secure Cell (SC).
Test SE Mode Description
0 0 M0
The circuit is in functional mode. Actual keys from
tpNVM applies to the Logic (Correct Functionality).
0 1 M1a The SCs hold their previous value. Based on the value
1 0 M1b of SE, RCs are in capture/shift mode.
1 1 M2
The SCs become part of the scan chain. Actual/Dummy
keys from SI for structural testing.
key using PO. This attack exploits (1) the availability of the shift-in process
through SI, and (2) the capability of reading out the PO through chip pin-outs
in the functional mode. Considering Fig. 2 as an illustrative example, the steps
of a shift-and-leak attack are as follows:
1. Identify leaky cells (LCs) that can leak info onto a PO.
2. Insert a stuck-at-fault at the chosen LC candidate.
3. Propagate the fault onto a PO (SCs set to unknown X ′s). If it fails to prop-
agate, it rules out this LC, and repeats steps 1 and 2.
4. Power up the chip in mode M0 to load the correct key into SCs.
5. Switch to mode M1a (SCs hold value) and shift in d-bit reverse-shifted of the
leak condition into the scan. The value of d is the scan distance between the
targeted SC and the chosen LC.
6. Switch to mode M2 (SCs are in the scan), and perform d-bit shift to have
the leak condition in place and the key in chosen LC.
7. Clocklessly switch to mode M0 and observe the PO, to leak the content of
the LC, i.e., the target key bit.
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(b) The Scan Chain Configuration when SE=1. (d = 2)
FiCRC4
FiCRC3
FiCRC2SC
RC1
RC0
RC2 RC6
RC5
RC4
RC3
Chosen 
LC
Propagate 
Path
RC0 RC1 RC2 RC3 SC RC4 RC5 RC6SI
SO
- - - 1
ki
ki 0 - -
- - - - - 1 ki 0
(c) Shift-in the leaky condition (d-bit reverse-shifted) based on d=2.
FiCRC4
FiCRC3
FiCRC2SC
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RC3
Chosen 
LC
Propagate 
Path
RC0 RC1 R 2 RC3 SC RC4 RC5 RC6SI
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ki
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(d) shift all FFs, including SCs and RCs, in Mode M2, to put the ki into the LC.
Fig. 2: Example of shift-and-leak attack on R-DFS.
The authors noted that when the number of SCs increases, ATPG may fail to
find a leak condition for the chosen LC. To address this challenge, by exploiting
the conventional SAT attack [19], a pre-processing step was added to the shift-
and-leak attack, in which the logic cone was treated as a locked combinational
circuit considering RCs as the primary inputs and SCs as the key inputs. The
pre-processing phase (which resembles the steps of the conventional SAT attack)
is launched as follows:
1. Extract the combinational fan-in cones of the PO.
2. Obtain a Discriminating Input (DIP) from the SAT tool on the extracted
circuit.
3. Power on the IC in mode M0 (SCs capture the actual key).
4. Switch to M1a (SCs hold their values), and shift in the obtained DIP from
the SAT tool to the RCs.
5. Clocklessly switch to mode M0 and observe the PO (eval of the SAT attack).
Then, go to step 2 until no more DIP found.
1.3 mR-DFS: Resisting Shift-and-Leak
As a countermeasure to the shift-and-leak attack, the work in [18] proposes a
modified version of robust design-for-security architecture (denoted as mR-DFS
in this paper) with a slight modification to the R-DFS. Since mode M1a is used
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Fig. 3: Mode Switch Shift Disable (MSSD) in mR-DFS.
in the shift-and-leak attack to shift-in the known patterns (leak condition or
DIP) to RCs, in mR-DFS, this mode is blocked. Also, to avoid any other form
of leakage, after switching to mode M0, it is not possible to re-enable any shift
mode in the scan chain. To do that, as shown in Fig. 3, they build a shift disable
(SD) signal, such that when Test = 1, SD follows SE. But, after the first capture
of the actual key, i.e. when the Test is low or when there is a positive transition
on the Test, SD becomes ALWAYS ZERO, thereby blocking the shift operation.
Hence, there is no longer a mode where SCs can be bypassed, retaining their
values, while RCs can be loaded/shifted.
2 mR-DFS Architectural Drawbacks
Although mR-DFS addresses the leakage problem in R-DFS using shift disable
(SD), the introduction of this shift disable (SD) signal in mR-DFS poses some
new challenges for design and implementation flow, as well as test and debug
process. These challenges are discussed next:
2.1 High Functional Test Time
Since there is no longer mode M1a in mR-DFS architecture, the tester has to
rely on mode M2 to shift in and load the RCs. Also, since the shift is disabled
when Test=0 or after the first positive transition on the Test, Test must be
high during power ON. Hence, the tester should use M2 as the initial mode to
shift in and load the initial state into the RCs. After loading the initial state, the
tester switches the mode to M0 to load the actual key. Since it is not possible
to re-enable the shift process after switching to mode M0, the tester has to rely
on the responses on PO. For the next test pattern, the tester needs to switch
back to the mode M2 to shift in and re-load the initial state corresponded to the
next pattern. However, due to the blockage of the shift operation after switching
to mode M0 (Test = 0), the tester cannot use shift-in anymore for shifting in
the next initial state. Hence, the tester has to reset the FF of MSSD circuitry
to re-enable shift-in. This reset re-enables the SD to follow SE, thereby, the
tester can shift in the next initial state. However this reset (sys rst) will clear all
storage elements, including SCs. So, it forces the tester to re-load the keys for
the next test pattern. Hence, the actual key must be loaded again from tpNVM
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to accomplish the functional test, and this key reloading process (with each test
pattern) significantly increases the functional test time. It should be noted that
the initial state could be chosen to be used for a group of test patterns; however,
choosing a specific initial state to be used for a group of patterns would increase
the complexity of the functional test significantly. Besides, the designer cannot
separate the reset pins for MSSD. Assuming that this reset pin is separated, the
adversary can engage it to re-enable shift operation while the actual key is in
place.
2.2 Necessity of Duplicating the SCs
In mR-DFS, after shifting in the initial state to the RCs using mode M2, the
tester switches to mode M0 for only one cycle to load the actual key. However,
during this one cycle, the RCs (loaded by initial state) would be updated. To
avoid this problem, a clock gating circuitry has been introduced in mR-DFS to
disable the clock for one clock cycle after switching from M2 to M0.
Without any consideration for this requirement in mR-DFS architecture,
there are two possible methods to load the actual key from tpNVM in one clock
cycle, however, both of them incurs considerable performance/area overhead:
(1) engaging an ultra-wide memory that provides all bits of logic obfuscation
key at once using only one read operation, (2) engaging temporary registers
(FFs) to load the key into them at power ON, then connecting each SC to its
corresponding temporary register to be loaded in one clock cycle.
Regarding the former solution, it is required to have direct wiring from
tpNVM to each SC (per each key gate). Hence, the ultra-wide memory must
have an extremely high fanout to provide this direct connection. This ultra-high
fanout wiring increases the complexity of placement and routing (PnR) process,
and it would significantly decrease the performance of the design, and due to
optimization constraints in each design, using this scheme is almost impractical.
By choosing the latter method, the incurred overhead is more reasonable.
However, the required reset (sys rst) for loading the next initial state will clear
whole registers in the chip. So, a key re-loading from tpNVM to the temporary
register is required for each (group of) test pattern. It raises two big problems
in mR-DFS: (1) It significantly increases the required time for functional test,
and (2) Since key re-loading takes more than one clock cycle, it violates the
assumption of mR-DFS, where clock-gating disables the clock signal only for
one clock cycle to preserve the value of the RCs. So, after only one clock cycle,
during the key re-loading, the RCs would be updated, and the functional test
will fail.
2.3 Re-enabling Shift using Leaky Glitches
In mR-DFS, as shown in Fig. 3, the selector of MUX21 in RCs is controlled
by SD, which becomes ALWAYS ZERO immediately after the first attempt of
switching back from mode M0 to M2 (re-enabling shift process). Switching from
mode M0 to M2 means that there is a positive transition on the Test pin, and
8
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Fig. 4: Re-enabling Shift after Actual Key Load.
this positive transition allows the FF in MSSD circuitry to capture its input
(CONSTANT ONE ). However, there is still a possibility to switch back from
mode M0 to M2 (positive transition on the Test pin) while the FF does not
capture its input (CONSTANT ONE ) to make SD to be ALWAYS ZERO. To
show that, we draw a timing diagram of the post-synthesis timing simulation of
all internal wires of MSSD circuitry.
As shown in Fig. 4(a), a delay unit (DU) has been used as a part of the
fan-in-cone of the FF in MSSD circuitry, which is built using 10 inverters [18].
Assuming that the adversary is aware of timing information of the circuit, as
shown in Fig. 4(b), she generates a stimuli for Test pin in which the duration of
high pulses is less than the delay of DU (tpulse < dDU ). Hence, the inputs of the
first AND gate, i.e. Test and Testd, have no overlap when both signals are high,
and accordingly, DFF’s clk would be ALWAYS ZERO. Since it is assumed that
the DFF sets to 0 on reset, QFF would also be ALWAYS ZERO. So, the function
of NOR gate is similar to NOT gate, whose input is Testnot. Consequently, mask
follows Test with a delay of dnot + dnor, and similarly, if we suppose that SE is
ALWAYS ONE, SD follows Test with a delay of dnot + dnor + dand. Since SD
controls the shift operation in mR-DFS, using these potential glitches, the SD
can re-enable the shift operation after mode M0.
9
3 Proposed Solution
When the logic obfuscation is in place, to introduce a secure and robust scan
chain architecture, three requirements must be met:
1. There must be no possibility of key leakage during the test.
2. Both structural test and functional test must be carried out in a reasonable
time (low test time overhead compared to the test time of the original design)
without significant loss of coverage.
3. The complexity of test flow (structural and functional) and the overhead of
secure scan chain architecture must be minimized.
In our proposed key-trapped DFS (kt-DFS), the scan chain(s) of the SCs are
completely decoupled from the scan chain(s) of the RCs. In fact, there is no
reason for stitching the RC and SC cells in one chain, which has been
the source of vulnerability in both R-DFS and mR-DFS. As illustrated
in Fig. 5(a), there is no common path between RCs and SCs in our proposed kt-
DFS architecture. Also, considering that the SCs are only responsible to store the
key value, none of the internal operations/computations overwrites the content
of the SCs. So, when the scan chain is in place for the SCs, only the shift-in
through SI is available for them to load the keys, and the SO is permanently
blocked for scan chain(s) of the SCs.
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Fig. 5: (a) kt-DFS Architecture with New Re-designed Blockage Circuitry, (b) Using
1wSC for Logic Locking Key. KSE determines the source of the key (tpNVM or KSI).
To guarantee the security of SCs against any form of leakage, we re-design and
introduce a new secure cell, called 1-way secure cell (1wSC). Fig. 5(b) depicts
the details of 1wSC. Each 1wSC has two internal storage elements: a scan-
connected storage (denoted as FF1), and a trap storage (denoted as FF2). The
scan-connected storage could be used to shift values in and out of the 1wSC or
into the trap storage. However, the value of the trap storage cannot be shifted
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out, and is only connected to its corresponded key gate. The transfer of key
value from FF1 to FF2 takes place after setting REG = 1 and SE = 0, which
is called register mode. Registration of the key into trap storage takes place on
the rising edge of the clock input of the FF2, which is a function of REG and
SE. Also, this condition is used as the RESET condition of all FF1s to clear
their values. Hence, AND(Test, SE) is used as the clock source of FF2s, and
its toggled is used as the RESET for FF1s.
Also, the trap storage does not have a reset, and upon power-up randomly
initialized to 0 or 1. So, upon transition of the key from scan-connected storage to
the trap storage, since the storage is initialized randomly, the adversary cannot
determine the previous value of the trap storage. This prevents the back-side
imaging attack based on the captured heat map as described in [16] (e.g. when
the activity is observed on heat map for a specific storage element, the adversary
cannot determine if the transition is {0 → 1} or {1 → 0}, and if NO activity is
observed, the adversary cannot determine if the transition is {0 → 1} or {1 →
1}).
In our proposed kt-DFS, the keys could be loaded into 1wSC from either tp-
NVM or scan-in (SI). Hence, the tester would be able to carry out the structural
test by loading the desired key using SI. But, since the scan chain(s) of 1wSCs
are decoupled in kt-DFS, two dedicated scan-enable and scan-in are used for the
scan chain(s) of the SCs, called KSE and KSI respectively.
The behavior of 1wSC is controlled using two pins, here called REG and SE.
As captured in Table 3, based on these two pins, a 1wSC can be operated in
three main modes:
1. Functional Mode (M0): {REG, SE}={0,0}, and the RCs are in capture
mode. Trap storage (FF2s) must have the key. However, scan-connected stor-
age (FF1s) is able to capture a new key.
2. Shift Mode (M1,3): {REG, SE}={X,1}, and the RCs are in shift mode.
Scan-connected storage (FF1s) is able to capture the key simultaneously, and
there is no action on trap storage (FF2s).
3. Register Mode (M2): {REG, SE}={1,0}, and the pre-loaded key in scan-
connected storage (FF1s) would be written to trap storage (FF2s), and scan-
connected storage (FF1s) will be cleared.
Similar to R-DFS and mR-DFS, a blockage circuitry is required to block
the SO after the first attempt of key loading from the tpNVM. To support our
proposed operational modes in the kt-DFS, a new blockage circuitry is designed.
In kt-DFS, the SO must be blocked after loading the actual keys into FF2s.
When KSE is low, the FF1 is fed using tpNVM. Hence, KSE is used to mask
the SO. Note that the actual key would be loaded into FF2 when REG = 1 and
SE = 0 (register mode). However, before this condition, the tester has to load
the actual key into FF1s while the KSE is low. Hence, by only considering KSE
= 0 as the blocking condition, we also cover the register-mode. Accordingly, the
SO would be no longer available when KSE becomes low.
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Table 3: Modes of Operation in kt-DFS.
REG SE Mode Description
0 0
M0 FF2 must have the key*.
(Functional Mode) FF1 could capture the key*.
0 1
M1 FF1 could capture the key*.
(Shift Mode)
1 0
M2 FF2 are fed from FF1.
(Register Mode) FF1 will be reset to ZERO. Chain is erased.
1 1
M3 FF1 could capture the key*.
(Shift Mode)
* Based on KSE, actual/dummy key could be loaded from tpNVM/KSI
3.1 No Possibility of Key Leakage in kt-DFS
Considering that the leakage problem in R-DFS and mR-DFS is for unnecessary
stitching of the RC and SC in the same scan chain, we fully decouple the SCs
and RCs scan chains in kt-DFS, and the output of the scan chain(s) of SCs is
permanently blocked. The values stored in the scan-connected storage (FF1s)
will be cleared with the transfer of the key to the trap storage (FF2s). This
guarantees that key values are trapped and no either regular or glitch-based
shift can leak the key values to the SO.
3.2 Functional/Structural Test in kt-DFS
In kt-DFS architecture, the functional test and the structural test could be done
without any significant limitation or any substantial overhead. For the structural
test, since the SCs are equipped with new KSE and KSI pins, it could be
accomplished using the following steps:
1. Set KSE → 1 and mode to M0. Shift in a dummy key via KSI.
2. Switch to mode M2 to write the key into FF2, and to clear FF1.
3. Switch to mode M1 to shift in the initial state into RCs.
4. Switch to mode M0 for one clock cycle for capturing new state.
5. Switch again to mode M1 to shift out the RCs to SO.
Unlike the structural test, the functional test requires the actual key. Hence,
loading the key from tpNVM followed by register mode will block the SO. Con-
sidering the blockage of the SO, the steps of the functional test is as follows:
1. Set KSE → 0 and mode to M0. Shift in the actual key from tpNVM. (When
KSE = 0, the SO is blocked.)
2. Switch to mode M2 to write the key into FF2, and to clear FF1. (Once KSE
= 0 and mode is M2, the SO will no longer available.)
3. Switch to mode M1 to shift in the initial state into the RCs.
4. Switch to mode M0 for one clock cycle for capturing new state, and clocklessly
observe the PO.
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It should be noted that similar to R-DFS and mR-DFS, the tester accom-
plishes the functional test through observing the PO with negligible loss of cov-
erage.
3.3 Test Complexity and Scan Chain Overhead
Table 4: Area Overhead, Test Coverage, and Leakage Comparison between R-DFS,
mR-DFS using MSSD, and proposed kt-DFS for Identical Timing Constraints. (Key
Size = 128, Number of Scan Chain = 1)
Benchmark
Original R-DFS [24]
Test Coverage Area Overhead Test Coverage Key Recovered
(%) (%) (%) (#)
s35932 100 12.49% 100 127
s38417 100 13.84% 100 128
s38584 100 14.85% 100 128
b17 99.91 6.24% 99.72 127
b18 99.77 3.08% 99.78 126
b19 99.8 1.17% 99.78 127
Benchmark
Original mR-DFS using MSSD [18]
Test Coverage Area Overhead Test Coverage Key Recovered
(%) (%) (%) (#)
s35932 100 8.16% 100 127
s38417 100 9.31% 100 128
s38584 100 11.17% 100 128
b17 99.91 4.79% 99.69 127
b18 99.77 1.75% 99.77 126
b19 99.81 0.67% 99.79 127
Benchmark
Original Proposed kt-DFS
Test Coverage Area Overhead Test Coverage Key Recovered
(%) (%) (%) (#)
s35932 100 5.21% 100 0
s38417 100 5.91% 100 0
s38584 100 6.27% 100 0
b17 99.91 1.84% 99.67 0
b18 99.77 0.55% 99.73 0
b19 99.8 0.24% 99.78 0
Decoupling the scan chain(s) of SCs from that of RCs helps to facilitate
the test flow for the tester compared to the test flow in mR-DFS. Despite mR-
DFS with a mandatory sys rst for each (group of) test pattern, no additional
operation is required in kt-DFS for any form of the test. No sys rst is required,
and none of the operations is blocked after the first attempt of the actual key
loading from tpNVM, and similar to R-DFS, only the SO is blocked to break
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the SAT attack. However, unlike R-DFS, it is fully secure against any form of
leakage-based attacks, such as shift-and-leak.
The 1wSC in our proposed kt-DFS has two storage units and has a larger
footprint compared to the SCs used in R-DFS and mR-DFS. However, the R-
DFS and mR-DFS also need to transfer the key values from tpNVM to SCs.
Using a very wide memory to derive thousands of keys is quite demanding in
terms of area, and it imposes higher complexity during PnR. Hence, the R-DFS
and mR-DFS also need to resort to a chain of temporary registers to transfer the
keys. This means there is also a duplicated register per each SC in both R-DFS
and mR-DFS. Furthermore, compared to MUX41 in both R-DFS and mR-DFS,
only one AND gate and one NOT have been used in each 1wSC, which slightly
improves the area overhead.
4 Experimental Result
To analyze the security of the kt-DFS, and to provide better comparative re-
sults, we engage the same ITC-99 and ISCAS-89 benchmark circuits as used in
mR-DFS [18]. We engaged strong logic locking (SLL) [5] in all experiments to
determine the location of key gates, and the number of key bits is 128. All the
experiments have been accomplished on a Dell PowerEdge R620 equipped with
Intel Xeon E5-2670 2.50GHz and 64GB of RAM, using Synopsys Design Com-
piler 2017.09, Tetramax 2017.09, and VCS 2017.12 tools along with the Synopsys
generic 32nm library.
Table 4 represents the area overhead, test coverage, and the leakage of R-
DFS, mR-DFS, and our proposed kt-DFS. The number of (regular) scan chains
(composed of RCs) is set to be one. This is because with a large number of scan
chains, the length of each scan chain will be short. Hence, the chosen LCs can
leak the content of a smaller number of SCs from their shorter scan chains, which
decreases the success rate of the shift-and-leak attack. Hence, we assume that
there is only one scan chain in the circuit to make it the best-case scenario for
the shift-and-leak.
Considering that the access to the scan chain is restricted, the SAT attack
cannot be deployed. This does not prevent an attacker from deploying the un-
rolling or bounded-model-checking (BMC) [14] attack that only relies on PI/PO.
However, this group of attacks runs into scalability issues as they rely on two
sub-routines which are in PSPACE and NP [18]. Even the accelerated version of
this attack (described in [8]) fails to terminate for even small designs. Besides,
new techniques such as DFSSD [23] shows how low overhead techniques, like
deep faults and shallow state duality, could be used to break the state-of-the-
art sequential SAT attacks. Hence, Table 4 only reflects the effectiveness of the
shift-and-leak attack.
To evaluate the possibility of the leakage in R-DFS, we engage the shift-and-
leak attack in [18] with no change. However, for mR-DFS, we integrated the
glitch propagation that described in Section 2.3 with the shift-and-leak attack.
Although the mR-DFS is resilient against the original shift-and-leak attack, as-
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suming the potential glitches in MSSD, as well as controlling the sys clk using an
external clock generator, the security of mR-DFS and R-DFS is at the same level,
and both could be broken by leaking the key bits onto PO. However, there is
no leakage possibility in the proposed kt-DFS, and the adversary cannot recover
the content of any SC.
Regarding the area overhead, we assume that both R-DFS and mR-DFS use
temporary registers to transfer the key values from tpNVM to SCs (this has
lower overhead compared to using a very wide memory). Hence, as a part of the
logic obfuscation circuit, these temporary registers affect the area overhead. Note
that in our proposed kt-DFS, these temporary registers are part of 1wSC. Also,
compared to SCs in R-DFS and mR-DFS less basic gates are used in kt-DFS.
Overall, compared to R-DFS and mR-DFS, kt-DFS reduces the area overhead
by 61% and 44%, respectively.
As discussed previously, all three schemes block the SO after the first attempt
of key loading from tpNVM. Hence, all have to rely on the PO for the functional
test. As shown in Table 4, the test coverage loss is negligible and almost identical
in all schemes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we first evaluated the information/key leakage possibility and de-
sign methodology drawbacks of recently published DFS architectures in the pres-
ence of scan chain locking. Then, we proposed a new obfuscated DFS solution,
denoted as key-trapped DFS (kt-DFS) that addresses the prior art shortcom-
ings. In kt-DFS, we introduced a new secure storage cell for the storage of key
values. The proposed secure cell allows us to trap the key after being loaded,
preventing different forms of shift and leak attacks (glitch based or logic-based),
while safely removing the key upon transition from functional to test mode. At
the same time, we illustrated that using the proposed DFS, the design can safely
undergo manufacturing and functional testing without incurring any significant
limitation in terms of increase in the test time (functional or manufacturing)
while maintaining desirably low overhead.
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